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The increasing interconnection between computers has created a vision for Grids. Within
these Grids, computing resources such as processing power, storage space or applications are
accessible to any participant. This accessibility has major ramifications for organizations since
they can reduce costs by outsourcing nonessential elements of their IT infrastructure to various
forms of service providers. Such emerging e-Utilities – providers offering on-demand access
to computing resources – enable organizations to perform computational jobs spontaneously
through other resources in the Grid that are not under the control of the (temporary) user
(Foster et al., 2002).
With the implementation of Grid middleware, institutional arrangements are becoming
increasingly important. In essence, current Grid middleware provides insufficient incentive to
participate in the Grid. In this context, the application of markets for the Grid is considered to
work well. By assigning a value (also called utility) to their service requests, users can reveal
their relative urgency or costs to the service, which is subject to service usage constraints. If
the market mechanism is properly defined, users may be provided incentives to express their
true values for service requests and offers. This in turn marks the prerequisite for attaining an
efficient allocation of services, which maximizes the sum of aggregate valuations (Schnizler
et al., 2005).
MACE – a multi-attribute combinatorial exchange – is a suitable auction mechanism for
allocating and scheduling resources in the Grid (Schnizler et al., 2006). In contrast to other
approaches, the proposed mechanism accounts for the variety of services by incorporating
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time and quality as well as coupling constraints. The mechanism provides buyers and sellers
with a rich bidding language, allowing for the formulation of bundles expressing either
substitutabilities or complementarities. The winner determination problem maximizes the
social welfare of this combinatorial allocation problem. The winner determination scheme
alone, however, is insufficient to guarantee an efficient allocation of the services. The pricing
scheme must be constructed in a way that motivates buyers and sellers to reveal their true
valuations and reservation prices. This is problematic in the case of combinatorial exchanges,
since the only efficient pricing schedule, the VCG mechanism, is not budget-balanced and must
be subsidized from outside the mechanism.
The auction implements on a new pricing family for a combinatorial exchange, namely
the k-pricing rule. In essence, the k-pricing rule determines the price such that the resulting
surpluses to the buyers and sellers divide the entire surplus being accrued by the trade according
to the ration k. The k-pricing rule is budget-balanced but cannot retain the efficiency property
of the VCG payments. As a simulation illustrates, the k-pricing is approximative incentive
compatible and, thus, a practical alternative to the VCG mechanism and highly relevant for an
application in the Grid (Schnizler et al., 2006).
Future research of MACE needs to consider alternative heuristics that simplify the winner
determination problem. Nature-inspired algorithms such as genetic algorithms may be adequate
for an application in the service market. A further step towards a functioning Open Grid Market
would be to confront the mechanism with real data in a pilot run.
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